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Introduction
Over the years, there have been many calls for more 
research on the scope and severity of financial elder abuse 
(Pillemer, Connolly, Breckman, Spreng, & Lachs, 2015), as 
well as commentary on the need for society giving higher 
priority to prevention (Whitman, 2015). Perhaps more 
worrying than the paucity of research is concern that the 
quality of the research into elder abuse has advanced lit-
tle in the decades since it first came to the attention of 
the research community around the world. Hafemeister 
(2003), acknowledging the poverty of intellectual debate 
in the field of financial elder abuse, has argued strongly 
for a more rigorous approach to developing concepts, 
definitions, and theory. Like Dessin (1999–2000), he 
argued that this research should be based on the specific 
and distinguishing characteristics of this type abuse, com-
paring and contrasting theorizing in related fields as use-
ful ways of advancing research in the subject of financial 
elder abuse.
In this article, we shall outline a model of decision mak-
ing—the bystander intervention model—which has consid-
erable potential as theoretical underpinning for research, as 
well as for developing training in relation to the detection 
and prevention of financial elder abuse. We shall draw on 
our own research to describe the potential of this model in 
detecting and intervening in cases of financial elder abuse 
(Davies et al., 2011; Davies, Gilhooly, Gilhooly, Harries, & 
Cairns, 2013; Gilbert, Stanley, Penhale, & Gilhooly, 2013; 
Gilhooly et al., 2013; Harries, Davies, Gilhooly, Gilhooly 
& Cairns, 2014a; Harries, Davies, Gilhooly, Gilhooly, & 
Tomlinson, 2014b)
Terminology, Definitions, and Conceptualizations
Interestingly, there is no agreed terminology or definition 
of elder financial abuse. The World Health Organization 
report refers to “elder maltreatment” (Sethi et al., 2011). 
In the United Kingdom, it is common practice to use “elder 
financial abuse” or “financial elder abuse.” Increasingly, the 
term “exploitation” is viewed as more appropriate.
In the United Kingdom, elder financial abuse is defined 
in the guidance document No Secrets, as “including theft, 
fraud, exploitation, pressure in connection with wills, prop-
erty or inheritance or financial transactions, or the misuse 
or misappropriation of property, possessions or benefits 
(Department of Health and Home Office, 2000, p. 9, Section 
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2.7).” The National Center on Elder Abuse in the United 
States defines financial exploitation as the “illegal taking, 
misuse or concealment of funds, property, or assets of a 
vulnerable elder” (NCEA, 2014). Action on Elder Abuse, a 
U.K. charity, describes financial elder abuse as follows:
 “another name for stealing or defrauding someone of 
goods and/or property. It is always a crime but is not 
always prosecuted. Sometime the issue is straightfor-
ward, for example a careworker stealing from an older 
person’s purse, but at other times it is more difficult to 
address. This is because very often the perpetrator can 
be someone’s son or daughter, or age prejudice means 
that other people assume it is not happening or that the 
older person is to blame.
Despite these differences, all the conceptualizations of 
financial elder abuse have built on essential notions of 
rights and trust and the need for prevention of harm and 
distress. Many organizations in the United Kingdom pro-
vide factsheets or practice guidance outlining the nature and 
types of financial elder abuse, all of which put an emphasis 
on particular behaviors and settings (Age UK, 2015; The 
Law Society, 2015). The motivations of the perpetrators 
are of importance as well. Drawing on the research by 
Brown (2003) and her colleagues, we have classified the 
motivations of perpetrators in our current research as
 • Malicious—deliberately not spending assets for the 
well-being of the donor to protect an inheritance
 • Malicious—deliberately spending or taking assets for 
their own personal benefit
 • Opportunistic—a spur of the moment, unplanned act
 • Misplaced moral justification—believing the victim 
would have wanted them to use the assets for their own 
benefit
 • Neglect
 • Incompetence
Scope and Severity
Prevalence 
If we look at the various studies around the world, it 
appears that financial abuse is either the most or the sec-
ond most common type of elder abuse. It must, however, 
be kept in mind that prevalence has been assessed in many 
different ways often with small samples, using self-report, 
and generally only community samples. In fact, in our view, 
the knowledge base in relation to prevalence is so limited 
that we are reluctant to even attempt to give an answer 
as to the size of the problem. Nevertheless, without some 
estimate of prevalence, we cannot convince policymakers 
to take this issue seriously and to provide more research 
funding. The following examples of prevalence studies will 
provide the reader with a feel of the range of prevalence 
figures globally.
The European wide survey of Germany, Greece, Italy, 
Lithuania, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden reported a pooled 
rate of 3.8% for financial abuse, with an estimated figure 
of 6 million people over the age of 60 experiencing finan-
cial abuse (World Health Organization Regional Office for 
Europe, 2011). Even if we postulate that around 2% of 
older people are abused financially, globally this would be 
a large number of people indicating the need for a better 
understanding of how best to address this issue (Table 1).
Financial and Psychological Impact 
Little is known about the impact of financial elder 
abuse (Fealy, Donnelly, Bergin, Treacy, & Phelan, 2012). 
Nevertheless, as noted by Cassandra Cross in her study of 
relationship scams, elderly victims of financial abuse do not 
just lose money, they experience humiliation, depression, 
and may even commit suicide (Cross, 2012). Lowndes, 
Darzins, Wainer, Owada, and Mihaljcic (2009) report that 
financial abuse via fraud and telemarketing can be as shat-
tering for an older adult as violence. The financial impact 
is greater on older people because they have less time 
and fewer opportunities to recover their financial losses 
(Crosby, Clark, Hayes, Jones, & Lievesley, 2008; Dessin, 
1999–2000). Loss of money may also make older people 
more dependent on the state and reduces the ability of 
victims to care for themselves. Yearly fraud loss has been 
calculated at £38.4 billion per year in the United Kingdom 
(Social Care Institute for Excellence, City of London Police, 
and National Fraud Intelligence Bureau, 2011).
Decision Making and the Bystander 
Intervention Model
It is often stated that the cases we see are just the “tip of 
the iceberg.” This suggests that financial abuse may be sus-
pected but no one intervenes. We must, therefore, come to 
a better understanding of the factors that influence decision 
Table 1. Examples of Prevalence of Financial Elder Abuse by 
Country
Country Prevalence (%) Authors (Year)
United Kingdom 0.7 O’Keeffe, Hills, Doyle, 
McCreadie, Scholes, 
and Constantine (2007)
Australia 1.1 Kurrle, Sadler, and 
Cameron (1992)
Ireland 1.3 Naughton et al. (2010)
United States 2.7/4.7 Peterson et al. (2014)
Spain 4.7 Garre-Olmo et al. (2009)
India 5.0 Chokkanathan and Lee 
(2005)
United States 5.2 Acierno et al. (2010)
United States 6.4/23 Beach et al. (2010)
China 13.6 Dong et al. (2007)
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making when professionals, family members, neighbors, 
and others suspect elder abuse and decide either to act 
or remain silent. We believe that the “bystander interven-
tion model” has considerable potential for theoretical 
underpinning research on detecting and preventing finan-
cial abuse as well as a method of structuring training for 
professionals.
Professional Bystander Intervention Model
Although developed to explain why people fail to act in 
emergencies (Darley and Latané, 1968; Latané and Darley, 
1970; Latané and Nida, 1981), the bystander intervention 
model has considerable potential to help us understand 
decision making in relation to the detection and prevention 
of elder financial abuse. There are five stages to our modi-
fied “professional bystander intervention model” (Gilhooly 
et al., 2013):
(1) noticing relevant cues to financial abuse,
(2) construing the situation as financial abuse,
(3) deciding the situation is a personal responsibility,
(4) knowing how to deal with the situation,
(5) deciding to intervene.
In the same way that a number of stages must be negotiated 
in cases of bystander intervention in emergencies, in non-
emergencies such as elder financial abuse, the same stages 
must also be negotiated. Although policies and guidelines 
might indicate what should be done and who should take 
responsibility once elder financial abuse is identified, the 
identification of elder financial abuse itself involves com-
plex judgments that are also part of the decision-making 
process.
Stage 1—Noticing the Cues to Financial Abuse
In traditional bystander intervention experiments, the 
study participant notices an event that he or she must then 
judge as an emergency or not. The cues to financial abuse, 
however, come to the attention of professionals in a variety 
of ways, for example, reports by family members, neigh-
bors, and other professionals, as well as through “direct 
observation,” that is, reports of the abuse by the victim or 
observation of some anomaly by the professional.
Direct Observation versus Reports—Layers of Complication 
In our study, comparing professionals in finance (banking 
and other financial organizations), health, and social care, 
finance professionals directly observed more cases of abuse 
than those reported to them by someone else. Social care 
professionals, however, were more reliant on cases being 
reported to them rather than directly observed. Health pro-
fessionals directly observed a similar number of cases as 
those reported to them by someone else.
The higher number of directly observed cases among 
finance professionals is perhaps unsurprising given that 
these professionals work within the financial sector, deal 
with monetary issues and often work very closely with 
customers on a day-to-day basis. Those in finance are also 
trained, as part of their role, to identify any unusual finan-
cial behaviors or transactions made by customers. In social 
care, the higher number of reported rather than directly 
observed cases may be reflective of the formal processes 
by which adult protection cases are dealt with. It is also 
unsurprising that there were more reported cases or refer-
rals than directly observed as social care professionals’ 
work with a range of cases, not just those who are at risk of 
abuse. Finally, health professionals are not only in a posi-
tion to witness cases of potential abuse (e.g., general medi-
cal practitioners or community nurses visiting patients at 
home) but they are also likely to be informed about cases 
of abuse. Patients are seen to hold them in a position of 
trust where sensitive information can be disclosed to them 
under the confines of patient confidentiality.
. . . we’re GPs, we’re medical doctors, we’re not sort 
of financial advisors and you know a person’s finances 
are not really any of our business. However, you know, 
if someone’s being abused; physically, mentally, psy-
chologically, financially, there’s someone who’s taking 
advantage of somebody else, then you know we do have 
a duty of care, but it is a very very difficult thing to pick 
up (GP Partner)
Professional Variations in Noticed Cues 
What are the “cues” or case features that raise suspicions 
of financial abuse? Various Web-based sources of informa-
tion provide lists of the “indicators” of financial abuse. For 
example, the U.K. charity Age UK (2015) lists change in liv-
ing conditions; lack of heating, clothing, or food; inability 
to pay bills/unexplained shortage of money; unexplained 
withdrawals from an account; unexplained loss/misplace-
ment of financial documents; the recent addition of author-
ized signers on a client or donor’s signature card; or sudden 
or unexpected changes in a will or other financial docu-
ments. Which of the indicators or cues of abuse are likely 
to be noticed will, of course, depend on the “observers” 
relation to the “victim.”
Our in-depth interviews revealed a very large number 
of “cues” that financial abuse might be taking place. As a 
consequence, we categorized the cues and explored varia-
tions between our three groups of study participants. What 
emerged was a similar picture for health and social care 
professionals, with three cue categories of importance in 
judgments: (1) types of abuse, (2) mental capacity, and (3) 
physical capacity (Davies et al., 2011).
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Stage 2—Construing the Situation as 
Financial Abuse
This stage of decision making is particularly problematic. It 
is not unknown for older people with lots of money to live 
very modestly. Warren Buffet, one of the richest men in the 
world, lives relatively modestly, but most of us would not see 
the difference between his wealth and the size of his house as 
an anomaly that would cause us to conclude that he is being 
financially exploited. Many of us make large cash withdraw-
als when we are about to go on holiday, but when would this 
be a cue for financial exploitation? There are many more 
examples that could be provided indicating that it is not 
just the behavior or the incident itself that brings about the 
conclusion that someone is being financially abused. A very 
complicated set of subdecisions have to be made to come to 
the conclusion that the cues represent actual financial abuse.
Our research revealed that certain cues are more impor-
tant to lead to certainty that abuse is taking place and, 
importantly, these cue categories were different for different 
professional groups. Among those in banking and finance, 
certainty of abuse was determined largely by the type of 
abuse, with mental and physical capacity accounting for 
only a small percentage of variance in judgments. Mental 
capacity was the most important cue for health and social 
care professionals, followed by the type of abuse (Davies 
et al., 2013; Gilhooly et al., 2013; Harries et al., 2014a). 
These differences in the impact of the cues on certainty that 
abuse is taking place are perhaps unsurprising. The focus in 
banking is often on protecting the money. Our finding that 
certainty was higher if more money was lost is interesting. 
When someone else was in charge of the money (lasting 
power of attorney or a third party signatory) those in finance 
more often noticed the cues to financial abuse. Professionals 
in social care, on the other hand, are charged with dealing 
with “vulnerable” people and, hence, are vigilant for signs 
of abuse of those lacking mental capacity and those who are 
dependent on others because of physical incapacity.
Our finding that some cues are weighed more heavily 
than others, and that certainty that abuse is indeed taking 
place is often determined by only a few factors, fits with 
other studies in the judgment and decision-making field 
(Kahneman and Frederick, 2005).
Stage 3—Deciding the Situation Is a Personal 
Responsibility
One might notice the cues of financial abuse, and might 
even decide that such abuse is most certainly taking place, 
but then decide that it is not a personal responsibility to act. 
In the United Kingdom, there is no legislation for manda-
tory reporting of elder abuse like that in the United States or 
Canada and, hence, it could be argued that it is somewhat 
easier to make the decision that it is not a personal respon-
sibility to act. Recent legislation in the United Kingdom—
the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and the Care Act 2014—has 
resulted in improved structures and processes for ensuring 
protection against abuse as well as imposing a responsibil-
ity on local councils for the well-being of all adults at risk in 
their local area. Professional codes of conduct too have been 
revised or strengthened to ensure greater recognition of the 
issue among professions dealing with vulnerable clients.
Stage 4—Knowing How to Deal with the 
Situation
Lack of experience in identifying and dealing with cases 
of financial abuse, as well as knowing how to appropri-
ately deal with the victim of abuse and potential abusers 
(particularly family members), were frequently reported 
in our research as difficulties faced by social care, health, 
and finance professionals. Our study participants reported 
a need for guidance and training tools to be developed to 
enable them to improve their ability to accurately identify 
financial elder abuse and to make the appropriate decisions:
if there was something set in stone, that says this is what 
you need to do, and this is what you can do within your 
own powers kind of thing
Stage 5—Deciding to Intervene
Even if one has noticed the cues, decided that they repre-
sent real financial abuse, assumes responsibility, and knows 
what to do, it is still possible that the decision taken will be 
to not intervene. Years of bystander research has supported 
the original findings that the greater the number of people 
involved, the less likely it is that any individual is likely 
to intervene (Fisher et al., 2011). Even when it was rela-
tively clear that financial abuse was taking place, partici-
pants in our study indicated that there were many barriers 
to acting. Finance professionals frequently highlighted the 
restrictions they faced particularly as a result of the Data 
Protection Act (UK Parliament, 1998) and the difficulty of 
reporting their suspicions for fear of consequences.
well the problem we have is Data Protection. Now we 
are very concerned you know, if we breach that, you 
know, it’s all very well and good if it turns out to be 
a genuine case but if we’ve misread the signs then . . .  
whether we’re in breach of Data Protection. So, you 
know, we’re a bit unsure of what exact procedures we 
can take (Investment Manager)
Interestingly, our study participants seemed unable to explain 
what the Data Protection Act (1998) stipulated that prevented 
them from reporting a case of suspected financial abuse 
One might notice the cues of financial 
abuse, and might even decide that such 
abuse is most certainly taking place, 
but then decide that it is not a personal 
responsibility to act.
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(Gilhooly et al., 2013). According to the British Banking 
Association (2010), only the refusal of the customer’s consent 
will prevent a case from being reported. If a bank suspects 
financial abuse but the customer either does not or is not pre-
pared to admit, they may be a victim; this is a difficult area 
for banks in terms of the customer mandate. There is only 
one reporting route that is via the Suspicious Activity Reports 
(SARs) regime to the Serious Organised Crime Agency under 
the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (The Stationery Office, 2015). 
Contacting any other organization or person, whether it be 
the customer, law enforcement, social services, or the victim’s 
family, before an SAR has been made to SOCA constitutes an 
offense for which the bank may be criminally liable.
A further difficulty faced by professionals was working 
with other agencies. Cases of financial elder abuse rarely 
had a positive outcome, often due to insufficient evidence 
to prosecute the perpetrator. Part of the problem involved 
working with various agencies that were unable to share 
information to support a case:
we tried to make some enquiries via the bank very ten-
tatively, and obviously even though she’d sort of said 
‘right this is my social worker and things put her on the 
line there’s been some irregularity here I  don’t under-
stand what’s happened,’ they obviously wouldn’t really 
tell us anything. (Team Manager)
All professional groups reported the need for more collab-
orative interagency working when detecting and prevent-
ing elder financial abuse to address this difficulty.
Layers of Complication 
The bystander intervention model leads to an expectation of 
a strong association between certainty that financial abuse 
was taking place and likelihood of action. Our study found 
such an association. However, what surprised us was that 
when comparing mean ratings for the scales, the mean for 
“likelihood of taking action” was greater than “certainty 
that financial abuse” was taking place (Davies et al., 2013). 
This suggests that when in doubt, many professionals play 
safe and take action to intervene. However, the finding 
that participants from social care were more likely to take 
action, and to take stronger actions than participants from 
health and finance, again shows that the setting and profes-
sional grouping is a strong determinant of intervention.
An interesting study in the United States, where most 
states have mandatory reporting, revealed another layer of 
complication in the process leading from noticing the cues for 
abuse to actually intervening. Rodriguez, Wallace, Woolf, and 
Mangione (2006) were interested in the factors that inhib-
ited reporting of elder abuse by physicians. They found three 
“paradoxes” that inhibited reporting: (1) physician–patient 
rapport—patients might reveal abuse because of rapport but 
would feel letdown and deceived if the abuse was reported; 
(2) quality of life—this paradox concerned the contradictory 
effects of reporting, which could include both improving and 
harming the patient’s life, for example, via placing a patient in 
a care home; and (3) physician control—mandatory reporting 
both decreased the onus on the physician to make the deci-
sion, while at the same time decreasing the physicians exer-
cise of judgment as to how to improve the patient’s welfare. 
It was, however, the finding that physicians would “give the 
benefit of the doubt” as to whether or not abuse was occur-
ring and would increase the strength of the evidence needed 
to bring about reporting that was to us of particular interest. 
It appears that physicians cognitively manipulate the cues to 
ensure the best outcome, a very intriguing, and perhaps unin-
tended consequence, of mandatory reporting laws.
Conclusion
Exploring decision making via the bystander intervention 
model has been instructive in a number of ways. First, our 
finding that professionals were more likely to decide that 
financial abuse is definitely taking place and were more likely 
to act, if the victim is mentally incapacitated, is a matter for 
serious concern. After all, we might want financial abuse 
to be detected and prevented well before people become 
mentally incapacitated. Determining the most urgent cases, 
based on mental capacity could, of course, be reflective of 
the pressure in the United Kingdom to direct scarce services 
where they are perceived as most needed as well as require-
ments of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (Department 
of Health, 2005) and the Care Act 2014 (Department of 
Health, 2014) that adults at risk be protected.
The fifth stage of our professional bystander interven-
tion model is taking action. The United Kingdom has strong 
social and cultural norms of nonintervention in the affairs 
of neighbors, other family members, and friends. Although 
the norms for those in professional roles are different, the 
general cultural norms are likely to influence decision mak-
ing in relation to the strength of the evidence needed to 
conclude with certainty that financial abuse is taking place 
and taking the decision to intervene.
More research is, of course, needed to determine the utility 
of the bystander intervention model in detecting and prevent-
ing financial elder abuse. However, we are of the view that 
the bystander intervention model has considerable potential 
for studying the decision making of both professionals and 
the public in relation not only to financial elder abuse in the 
community but also to neglect in hospitals and care homes. At 
any one of the five stages of our professional bystander inter-
vention model, decisions could be taken that prevent finan-
cial abuse coming to the attention of those in a position to 
intervene. Given that financial elder abuse is rarely observed 
directly, those who report their suspicions of abuse to a profes-
sional who might intervene, must also go through all the stages 
of the bystander model, adding another layer of complexity 
to the decision making that brings cases of financial abuse to 
... we might want financial abuse to be 
detected and prevented well before people 
become mentally incapacitated.
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the attention of authorities. In conclusion, looking through the 
lens of the bystander intervention model, it is perhaps unsur-
prising that reported cases are only the tip of the iceberg.
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